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ABSTRACT
We estimated the economic rent obtained currently (that is, in 2002) in the Namibian hake ﬁshery and the rent that
might potentially be obtainable if the ﬁshery were managed optimally in the sense of economics. We ﬁrst reviewed
previous economic and biological studies. We then used the theory and model of Arnason [1] to estimate the current
and potential rent in the Namibian hake ﬁshery. Our estimates were that the current rent is 21 million USD (90%
conﬁdence interval in sensitivity analysis: 13-31) in 2002, with the potential for rent of approximately 112-118 million
NAD (90% conﬁdence intervals: 90-140 for logistic model and 84-135 for Fox model) annually if the ﬁshery were
managed optimally, i.e., with a much larger stock and a smaller ﬁshing ﬂeet. These estimates were particularly
sensitive to some parameters, especially the cost parameter, but in general appeared to be fairly robust. Our estimate
of current rent is roughly in line with previous estimates of the same number, while our estimate of potential rent is
somewhat higher. We ﬁnd that approximately 5-6 times greater wealth could be generated from this ﬁshery if it were
managed in a way closer to the economic optimum.
Keywords: Economic rent; cape hake; Namibian hake.
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents estimates of the economic rent obtained in the Namibian hake ﬁshery in 2002 (the current rent),
and the rent that could potentially be earned if the ﬁshery were to be managed at the economic optimum. Economic
rent is often used by economists to measure the net beneﬁts obtained from exploitation of a natural resource. Economic
rent is deﬁned as the difference between what a factor of production is actually paid and the minimum amount that it
would have to be paid to remain in its current use. In the case of a ﬁshery, the key factor in question is the ﬁsh stock,
and the amount that it is ‘paid’ is the shadow price of the resource, i.e., the opportunity cost in terms of forgone future
rent of reducing the stock.
Realized and potential economic rent in a ﬁshery can be estimated in a variety of ways. First, one can construct a full
bioeconomic model of the ﬁshery and calculate rents in this model [2, 3]. A second approach is to use a green ac-
counting method and calculate rent as total revenue minus values such as intermediate consumption, compensation of
employees, consumption of capital and normal proﬁt [4]. Third, economic theory suggests that the price of individual
quotas should be directly related to the rent that is expected to be obtained by ﬁshing those quotas, implying that rent
can be estimated from these quota prices [5].
In this paper we ﬁrst review existing economic studies of the Namibian hake ﬁshery, with a focus on those that estimate
economic rent in the ﬁshery. We then use the model of Arnason [1], a version of the ﬁrst approach described above, to
estimate current and potential rent in the ﬁshery, and examine the likely reasons for the observed dissipation of rent.
REVIEW OF EXISTING ECONOMIC STUDIES
Cost and earnings studies
We are aware of a series of costs-and-earnings studies, conducted by the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
starting in 1994. This series was cited by Eide et al. [5] as a survey of the commercial industry that was begun in 1994
and conducted annually. These authors did not use the results of the surveys because: (1) the data are incomplete; (2)
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the data are not a representative sample; (3) some companies catch on behalf of other quota holders; and (4) some
company income from one species may include income from other species. Whatever the strengths and ﬂaws in these
data, we were unfortunately unable to obtain copies of any of the reports. However, Ithindi [6] presented much of the
data from the 2002 survey (see Table II), and we therefore used these data, presented below, for our rent estimates.
Bioeconomic model ﬁndings
There is a relatively small bioeconomics literature on Namibian hake. The papers available in the literature address
issues of allocation of catch between ﬁshing ﬂeets and between countries, with one article outlining a more general
assessment of the implications of different policies. We review these articles below.
Sumaila [2] analyzed the allocation of quota between wet ﬁsh and freezer bottom trawlers, the two major ﬂeets that
catch Namibian hake. He assumed an average exogenous total allowable catch (TAC) of 150,000 tonnes, and then
asked what would be the economically efﬁcient allocation of this quota between the two ﬂeets. He found that an
allocation of 100% of the quota to wet ﬁsh trawlers yielded the economically optimal solution, with the present value
of rent estimated to be 11.69 billion (billion = 109) Namibian dollars (NAD; 1 US dollar was worth 10.5 NAD in 2002,
and 6.4-7.5 NAD in 2003-2006. We present many quantities in current-year NAD as this is the currency used in the
original sources. However, we convert to 2002 USD in Table I), compared to 10.42 billion NAD for the current policy
objective of a 60% allocation to wet ﬁsh trawlers. The 100% allocation also yielded the greatest number of jobs: 7804
with 100% allocated to wet ﬁsh trawlers as opposed to 5219 with the 60% allocation.
Sumaila [3] developed his 2000 work [2] in two directions in a subsequent study, by: (1) using an age-structured
biological model and examining outcomes in terms of biodiversity, using what he called a “demographic diversity
index;” and (2) allowing the TAC to be set endogenously in the model. The diversity index measured the deviation
of the age structure of the population from that observed when there is no ﬁshing, with 100% signifying a system
identical to that with no ﬁshing. It was assumed that the ﬁshers themselves decided on a TAC, and the two ﬂeets
then decided whether or not to cooperate in managing the ﬁshery. Like the previous study, this one found that a full
allocation of quota to the wet ﬁsh trawlers, along with side-payments from the wet ﬁsh trawlers to the freezer trawlers,
yielded the most economically efﬁcient outcome, with present value of rents of 10.24 billion NAD and a diversity
index of 65%. Without side-payments, the best solution allocated most catch to the wet ﬁsh trawlers, and yielded a
total rent of 7.14 billion NAD and a diversity index of 78%. If the two ﬂeets did not cooperate in allocating catches
and instead maximized their individual rents, the total rent was 5.13 billion NAD with a diversity index of 56%.
Sumaila and Vasconcellos [7] used a mass-balance ecosystem model [8] and a standard bioeconomic model to assess
the impacts of distant-water ﬁshing ﬂeets (DWFs) on Namibia’s ﬁsheries. They compared twenty-year simulations
with and without DWFs in terms of biomass, catch and rent time series. They found that, from 1970-1989, the annual
average rent from the hake ﬁshery for the Namibian ﬂeets was 71 million NAD, but could have been 138 million NAD
if the DWFs had not been present. The authors attributed these losses incurred by the Namibian ﬂeet to the depletion
of ﬁsh stocks by the DWFs.
Armstrong and Sumaila [9] examined the effects of non-cooperation between Namibia and South Africa in managing
their ﬁsheries for the trans-boundary hake stocks. They used the logistic growth function to describe the stock dy-
namics, and then calculated the equilibrium with a sole owner, under open access, and under cooperation by the two
countries in managing the stocks. They ran simulations for 1990-2000, and estimated that total economic rent over
these 11 years could have been 8.6 billion NAD if the ﬁshery were optimally managed by a sole owner, while under
open access, by deﬁnition, there would be no economic rent. They characterized the actual management situation at
that time as non-cooperation, and estimated that this state of affairs cost the ﬁshery about 30% of potential economic
rent, or 327 million NAD annually.
Finally, Heymans and co-authors used an Ecopath with Ecosim ecosystem model and bioeconomic model to assess
tradeoffs between objectives for ﬁsheries management under different management approaches (JJ Heymans, UR
Sumaila, V Christensen, Scottish Association for Marine Science and University of British Columbia, unpublished
data). They used the dynamic model of Heymans et al. [10] and explored policies that maximized proﬁt, employment,
or “ecosystem status” [11], and then examined how much of each of these objectives must be forgone to gain in
terms of another objective. The authors found that proﬁt in Namibia’s ﬁsheries as a whole could be increased 2.6-fold
relative to the 1997 level, and employment increased 2.7-fold, by increasing effort in the demersal ﬁshery 20-fold and
adjusting effort in other ﬁsheries up or down less drastically. These changes would have relatively little effect on the
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Figure 1: Resource rent accruing in the Namibian hake ﬁshery as estimated by [4], assuming either a 20% or
30% return to ﬁxed capital.
ecosystem status indicator. The authors gave no absolute estimates of proﬁt or rent for either their simulations or the
base model.
Estimates of resource rents, proﬁtability, and economic health of the ﬁshery
Some of the bioeconomic models above give estimates of resource rent obtained or obtainable in the ﬁshery. We
summarize these estimates in Table I. Two other studies also provide estimates of resource rent; those studies are also
summarized in Table I, and we review them below.
Eide et al. [5] assessed the potential and realized rent in three ﬁsheries, including the Namibian hake ﬁshery, and ex-
amined how the potential rent is dissipated. The authors estimated rent accruing in the ﬁshery using the price at which
quota is informally leased among ﬁshers. For 2000-2002, they estimated actual rent accrual of 81-140 million NAD for
wet ﬁsh trawlers and 171-234 million NAD for freezer trawlers. Using ﬁrm-level data, the authors suggested that that
vast majority of resource rent accrues to large, established companies in the ﬁshery, rather than to smaller, newcomer
companies. By comparing the export value of hake as it leaves Namibia with the import value of hake as it arrives in
the European Union, the major importer of Namibia’s hake products, the authors deduced that a signiﬁcant portion of
resource rent (6-43% of the export value) is accrued abroad in the EU. Upon comparing government expenditures on
ﬁsheries management (3.7-5.9% of landed value) with government revenues from quota, bycatch, and license fees and
other levies, they found that there is a net transfer of rent from the ﬁshery to the government.
Lange et al. [12] and Lange [4] used an accounting approach to calculate rent in the ﬁshery and compare this to other
components of Namibia’s national wealth. They obtained data from Namibia’s national accounts on the following
aspects of the ﬁshery: total revenue; intermediate consumption; compensation of employees; consumption of ﬁxed
capital; normal proﬁt; and the value of the ﬁxed capital stock. They then estimated rent in the hake ﬁshery for 1990-98
using these values, and two plausible values for the opportunity cost of capital (20% and 30%; Fig. 1). Lange et al.
[12] also estimated the percentage of the rent accruing to the private sector for 1994-98 (Fig. 1).
State of the stock and level of exploitation
Several studies have recently examined the status of the hake stock and the level of exploitation using single-species
stock-assessment models as well as ecosystem models. We review two key studies below.
Butterworth and Rademeyer [13] reviewed stock assessments, stock status, and ﬁsheries management for southern
African hake stocks. They assessed the stock by ﬁtting an age-structure production model (ASPM) to abundance
indices and catch-at-age data from the commercial ﬁshery and research surveys. Their estimates of spawning biomass
as a fraction of carrying capacity (line) and annual catches (bars) are shown in Fig. 2. Their assessment showed a
gradual depletion of spawning biomass from the 1960s through to about 1990, since which time the stock rebounded
slightly and apparently stabilized somewhat at 25-30% of the carrying capacity. This biomass level is well below that
which would produce maximum sustainable yield.
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Figure 2: Time series of spawning biomass (Bsp) as a fraction of carrying capacity (K; line) and annual catch
(bars) from [13]. MSYL is the Bsp=K level that would produce maximum sustainable yield.
Kirchner and Ianelli [14] conducted a more recent stock-assessment based on the same ASPM as Butterworth and
Rademeyer [13]. They ﬁt a variety of models to the data, but their conclusion was consistently pessimistic: they
estimated the 2006 biomass to be between 25% and 55% (median approx. 30%) of that required to produce MSY, and
about 13% of carrying capacity. They concluded that the stock was clearly depleted and in need of recovery if there
is to be hope of improving future yields. Their analysis also indicated that TACs above 130,000 tonnes are likely to
result in further declines in spawning biomass and commercial catch rates. This is somewhat alarming, since catches
in 2005 and 2006 were in the area of 140,000 tonnes, well above the maximum suggested by these authors.
Transfers to and from the ﬁsheries sector
Transfers to the ﬁshery. We consider any government expenditure on the ﬁshery, including transfers of funds to the
industry and/or its participants and expenditures on ﬁsheries management, to be transfers to the ﬁshery.
Wiium and Uulenga [15] examined expenditures on management of all ﬁsheries in Namibia, and divided these ex-
penditures into those borne by Namibians (the government and the industry), and by foreign donors. The total cost
of ﬁsheries management to the Namibian government from 1994-1999 averaged 66 million NAD (range 52-82 mil-
lion NAD). On average, 57% of this spending was on monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS), 32% was spent
on research, and the remaining 11% was spent on other activities (e.g., administration). These costs accounted for
3.6-6.1% of the total landed value from Namibia’s ﬁsheries. These authors also reported that contributions to ﬁsheries
management from foreign donors declined from 39 million NAD in 1996 to 25 million NAD in 1999. We can roughly
attribute a speciﬁc portion of these amounts to the hake ﬁshery in proportion to the value of Namibia’s three main
ﬁsheries (sardine, hake, horse mackerel) during the years in question [4]. Hake accounted on average for 60% of
Namibia’s total ﬁsheries wealth during these years, so we can estimate that the average annual cost of managing the
hake ﬁshery was 40 million NAD.
Transfers from the ﬁshery. Wiium and Uulenga [15] quantiﬁed the government’s receipts obtained from the ﬁshing
industry on this basis. These receipts averaged 104 million NAD between 1994 and 1999 (range 72-132 million NAD),
with about 80% of this amount coming from quota fees. These payments comprised 6-15% of the landed value in any
given year. Eide et al. [5] estimated that 56-66% of total government revenue paid through fees and levies on the
ﬁsheries sector was obtained speciﬁcally from the hake ﬁshery.
Net transfer to/from the ﬁshery. Wiium and Uulenga [15], based on their estimates of transfers to and from the
ﬁshery (described above), estimated annual resource rent extracted by the government from all of Namibia’s ﬁsheries
during 1994-99 to have been 3-80 million NAD, averaging 37 million NAD.
We can combine the Eide et al. [5] estimate of revenues from the ﬁshery with our estimate of ﬁshery management
expenditure on the ﬁshery, to yield an estimate of net government revenue from the ﬁshery (Fig. 3). Net revenue has
varied substantially, and was even negative in 1996, when catches in the ﬁshery were unusually low. The average
annual net revenue from the ﬁshery over this period was 19.7 million NAD.
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Figure 3: Net revenue (million NAD) to the state from the hake ﬁshery. Based on data from [5] and [15].
METHODS
Estimates of current and potential rent
Arnason [1] presented a theory of resource rent in ﬁsheries, and based on this theory built a relatively simple model
to estimate potential and actual rents in the entire global ﬁshery. The key relationship in the theory is rent = Pq q,
where q is the quantity of ﬁsh supplied and Pq is the partial derivative of rent with respect to q.
We use this theory here to estimate rent in the Namibian hake ﬁshery. While current stock assessments of the resource
are conducted using an age-structured production model (ASPM), we use surplus production models (logistic and Fox)
for the sake of simplicity but use biological model parameters obtained from the ASPM. Due to our relative lack of
information about ﬁshing costs, we apply the simple harvest and cost functions applied by Arnason:
Y(e;x) = qeBb
sp
C(e) = ce+ fk
where Y is catch, q is a catchability coefﬁcient, e is ﬁshing effort, Bsp is spawning biomass, b reﬂects the degree of
schooling seen in hake, C is total cost of the ﬁshery, and fk is ﬁxed cost. We ran all calculations and simulations for
the model in R (http://www.r-project.org).
Model inputs
The model requires nine inputs, the sources of which are described below. Given the availability of economic data on
the ﬁshery (MFMR [16], as cited by Ithindi [6]), we used 2002 as our base year.
 Maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Kirchner and Ianelli [14] estimated MSY from 10 different variations
on their stock assessment model. The mean of their estimates from the eight models that converged in their
estimations was 308 thousand tonnes (range 278-335).
 Virgin stock biomass (Ksp). Estimates by Kirchner and Ianelli [14] of virgin spawning biomass in the eight
models that converged averaged 4977 thousand tonnes (range 4004-5598).
 Biomass growth in base year. Kirchner and Ianelli [14] reported that spawning biomass (Bsp) grew from 0.22 to
0.24 of spawning biomass at MSY (BMSY
sp ) from 2002 to 2003, so biomass growth (˙ x) in 2002 is ˙ x =0:02BMSY
sp .
These authors estimate BMSY
sp as 1593-2411 thousand tonnes, with an average estimate of 2100 thousand tonnes.
 Landings in base year. Kirchner and Ianelli [14] reported landings in 2002 as 156 thousand tonnes.
 Price of landings in base year. We can compute an implied ex-vessel price of ﬁsh from the landings (above) and
the total revenue from ﬁsh sales reported by the MFMR [16]: 733 million NAD. The implied price is therefore
4.70 NAD per kg.
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Table II: Revenue and expenses in the 2002 Namibian hake ﬁshery as reported in [6] from data in [16].
Revenue Amount
(million
NAD)
Expense Amount
(million
NAD)
Variable or
ﬁxed
Fish sales 734 Employment and payments 256 Variable
Commission for catches 7 Materials, insurance, repair and
maintenance
151 50% ﬁxed
Fees from use of quota 13 Fuel and lubrication 165 Variable
Vessel charter fees 17 Fishing gear 11 Variable
Fishery fees and levies 26 Fixed
Depreciation 34 Fixed
Opportunity cost 50 Fixed
Unloading, storage and freight,
harbour and charter fees
37 Variable
Bank charges and other expenses 14 Fixed
Total revenue 771 Total expenses 744
Table III: Biological and economic parameters of the Namibian hake ﬁshery implied by the input parameters
outlined above.
Parameter Value
Marginal cost (c) 4.14 million NAD per vessel
Fixed costs (fk) 188 million NAD
Logistic model
intrinsic growth (a) 0.248
scale parameter (b) 4:9710 5
catchability (q) 2:4610 3 vessel 1
Fox model
intrinsic growth (a) 1.43
scale parameter (b) 0.168
catchability (q) 2:4210 3 vessel 1
 Proﬁts in base year. From MFMR [16] data, with minor adjustments to allow for depreciation of assets and
opportunity cost of capital, Ithindi [6] estimated total proﬁt in the ﬁshery in 2002 as 34.176 million NAD.
 Fishing effort in base year. Ithindi [6] reported the number of vessels in the ﬁshery in 2001/02 as 121, and in
2002/03 as 126. We will therefore take the effort (i.e., ﬂeet size) to be 123.5 vessels.
 Fixed costs as a ratio of total costs. From MFMR [16] data, Ithindi [6] reported costs for the ﬁshery in
2002 (Table II). The costs that we consider as ﬁxed costs are labeled as such in the table. Note that we are
uncomfortable designating materials, insurance, repair and maintenance as either ﬁxed or variable, as this item
is quite likely to contain substantial portions of each kind of cost. We have therefore designated this item as 50%
ﬁxed and 50% variable, and test the sensitivity to this assumption below. On this basis, ﬁxed costs comprise
0.27 of total costs.
 Schooling parameter for the production function. Kirchner and Ianelli [14] assumed that commercial CPUE
provides an index of relative abundance, implicitly assuming a schooling parameter of 1. With no information
to suggest that this is unreasonable, we also make this assumption
These inputs imply a set of biological and economic parameters of the ﬁshery (Table III; see Arnason [1] for details of
the equations.
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Table IV: Descriptions of the current and potential states of the Namibian hake ﬁshery as estimated by the
model, using two different biological models. The difference columns show potential gains in moving from the
current situation to the optimal one. Proﬁt is deﬁned as revenue minus all costs, while rent is deﬁned as revenue
minus variable cost. Proﬁt and rent values are in 2002 currencies. The values in parentheses in the last row are
90% conﬁdence intervals calculated in the sensitivity analysis.
Current Optimal Difference
Logistic Fox Logistic Fox Logistic Fox
Biomass (thousand tonnes) 514 522 2668 2166 2154 1644
Harvest (thousand tonnes) 156 156 306 303 1510 147
Effort (vessels) 124 124 47 (42-71) 58 (51-82) -77 -66
Proﬁts (million NAD) 34 34 1059 998 1025 963
Proﬁts (million USD) 3.2 3.2 100 95 97 91
Rents (million NAD) 222 222 1247 1185 1025 963
Rents (million USD) 21 (13-31) 21 (13-31) 118
(90-140)
112
(84-135)
97
(59-127)
91
(53-122)
RESULTS
Model outputs
Given the above speciﬁcation, the model estimates the current and potential rent in the Namibian hake ﬁshery (Table
IV). Both models suggest that the biomass should be allowed to grow to four to ﬁve times greater levels than currently,
which would allow twice as much harvest to be taken by fewer than half as many vessels. This would allow rents 5-6
times greater than those currently generated.
Sensitivity analyses
We conducted two sensitivity analyses to assess the degree to which our input parameters would affect the rent esti-
mates. The ﬁrst analysis (Table V) consisted of increasing and decreasing the individual parameters (as shown in the
table) within reasonable ranges and recording the change in the effort and rent estimates obtained. Current and optimal
rent estimates were somewhat sensitive to landings and price values, but this should not be problematic as we can be
reasonably certain that the base values for landings and prices are accurate. There are two other instances where our
parameter perturbations caused changes in outcomes >15%: the ﬁxed cost to total cost ratio causes large changes in
current rent estimates, and the schooling parameter causes large changes in optimal effort estimates. However, the
optimal rent estimate is insensitive to both of these values, and the schooling parameter must be changed drastically
(to 0.8) before substantial changes are seen in the effort estimate.
The second sensitivity analysis involved a Monte Carlo approach, as follows. For each of the parameters except MSY
and the virgin stock biomass (Ksp), we used the same range as in the ﬁrst sensitivity analysis and took random draws
from a uniform distribution over this range. Since our estimates of MSY and Ksp are based on the different models
used by Kirchner and Ianelli [14], for each run of the sensitivity analysis we randomly selected one of their models
and used the MSY and Ksp associated with that model. For each draw of the complete set of parameters we then
ran the full set of calculations, and repeated this process 5000 times. The (5000(1  p)=2)th and (5000p=2)th values
in a sorted list are then taken to be the lower and upper, respectively, bounds of a 100p% conﬁdence interval. The
conﬁdence intervals are shown in Table IV, and the distributions of effort and rent obtained in the analysis are shown
in Fig. 4.
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Figure 4: Distributions of outputs obtained in the Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis. The top graphs show
optimal effort under the two different population models, while the bottom graphs show current rent (far left)
and optimal rent under the different population models.
DISCUSSION
Comparison to past rent estimates
We compared (Table VI) our rent estimate with those described in the literature reviewed above. Our estimate of
current rent lines up reasonably well with those of others. The estimates by Sumaila [3] and Armstrong and Sumaila
[9] are within 25% of our estimate. Sumaila and Vasconcellos [7] included rent accruing to the foreign ﬂeet during
a period of depletion, so their rent estimate should be expected to be higher. Eide et al. [5] estimated rent in 2002
as substantially higher than we did, but they used a very different method of estimating rent based on the price of
hake quota in a very informal market. Likewise, Lange et al. [12] used the national accounts to estimate rent, and so
we might expect substantial differences between our estimates and theirs. Moreover, the 2000 estimate by Lange et
al. [12] was much higher than their estimates in other years – the average of their estimates during 1990-98 was 180
million NAD, which is more in line with our estimate.
The estimates of potential rents are quite variable among studies, with our estimate being signiﬁcantly higher than
others’. This is generally because we estimate rent in an optimally managed ﬁshery, whereas the other studies estimate
potential rent given more speciﬁc policy modiﬁcations. Sumaila [2] had exogenous stock dynamics, and so did not
account for possibility of allowing the stock to rebuild; his focus was on allocation of a set quota among ﬂeets. Sumaila
[3] examined a ‘sole-owner’ case, which is comparable to our optimal management calculation, but again included
ﬂeet structure in the calculation; this might explain some of the discrepancy between our estimates and his. Sumaila
and Vasconcellos [7] studied an earlier system that had been depleted by DWFs, so their results are probably not very
comparable with ours. As well, they used an ecosystem model; this might introduce more biological constraints on
potential rent than our single-species model, but may also improve the realism of their model. Their simulations also
included a rebuilding period, when catches and therefore rent would be lower. Finally, Armstrong and Sumaila [9]
also found a sole-owner solution to their model. Their equilibrium stock size and harvest are comparable to ours (1900
and 370 thousand tonnes, respectively), suggesting that their economic parameters are probably different, e.g., the
price-to-cost ratio might be different between the two studies. Another possible source of the discrepancy is that they
assumed that the starting stock size is 900 thousand tonnes, so that there must be a rebuilding period with lower rent
than the optimal.
Rent dissipation
Our analysis suggests that the dissipation of rent comes from two sources: (1) overcapacity – the optimal solution calls
for the reduction of the ﬂeet from the 124 vessels in 2002 to 47-58 vessels; and (2) the current (as of 2002) serious
depletion of the ﬁsh stock – the calculations here suggest increasing the stock from its 2002 spawning biomass of 520
thousand tonnes to an optimal level in the range of 2100-2700 thousand tonnes. The current analysis cannot address
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Table VI: Comparison of our rent estimates with those in previous studies. Rent estimates ﬂagged with  were
originally presented as NPV or discounted values over a number of years; we have converted these back to an
annual value using the discount rate used in the study. All rent estimates are in million 2002 USD.
Study Year of
estimate
Rent Comments
Current rent
This study 2002 13-31
Sumaila [3] 1994-95 44*
Sumaila and
Vasconcellos[7]
1970-1989 189 Includes rent to foreign ﬂeet
1970-1989 19 Namibian ﬂeet only
Armstrong and Sumaila [9] 1990-2000 36*
Eide et al. [5] 2002 40
Lange et al. [12] 2000 88
Potential rent
This study n/a 84-140
Sumaila [2] 1990s 40* With full quota on wet ﬁsh ﬂeet
Sumaila [3] 1990s 87* With cooperation, side-payments
Sumaila and
Vasconcellos[7]
1970-1989 37 Namibian ﬂeet, with no DWFs
Armstrong and Sumaila [9] 1990-2000 63* International cooperation
issues of allocation within the ﬂeet since, as an approximation, it considers the ﬂeet to be a homogeneous group of
vessels.
Several authors of previous studies concerned with rent have addressed the causes of rent dissipation. The analysis of
Sumaila [2] suggested that allocation of quota to freezer trawlers accounted for some of the forgone rent. In contrast,
Eide et al. [5] argued that substantial rent was being forgone because of the allocation of quota to wet ﬁsh trawlers.
As discussed above, Armstrong and Sumaila [9] examined dissipation of rent by non-cooperation between Namibia
and South Africa in managing the hake ﬁshery, and found that this dissipation amounted to approximately 30% of
total potential rent. Finally, Armstrong et al. [17] estimated that the government was forgoing some rent collection,
averaging 74 million NAD annually, because of the lower quota fees charged under their Namibianisation policy.
However, this last value does not represent dissipation of rent, since the rent is simply accruing to the industry rather
than the government – it is simply a transfer of funds from the government to a sector of the industry.
SUMMARY
We estimated the current rent in the Namibian hake ﬁshery as 21 million USD (90% conﬁdence interval: 13-31) in
2002, with the potential for approximately 112-118 million USD (90% conﬁdence interval: 90-140 for logistic model,
84-135 for Fox model) annually if the ﬁshery were managed optimally, i.e., with a much larger stock and a smaller
ﬁshing ﬂeet. These estimates are particularly sensitive to some parameters, especially the cost parameter, but in general
appear to be fairly robust. Our estimate of current rent is roughly in line with previous estimates of the same number,
while our estimate of potential rent is somewhat higher, for the reasons described above. What should not be in doubt,
however, is that substantially greater wealth could be generated from this ﬁshery if it were managed in a way closer to
the economic optimum.
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